Walter Lohmann (born 30 December 1878 in Bremen; died 29 April 1930 in Rome) was a German Reichsmarine officer with the rank of captain. From 1920 to 1927 as commander of the Naval Transportation Division, Lohmann ran a secret rearmament and research program on behalf of the Ministry of the Reichswehr in an attempt to circumvent the Versailles restrictions. Lohmann's access to naval offices in Königsberg, Lübeck, Stettin, Hamburg, and Bremen gave him access to very specialized information and financial resources. He used this knowledge in his work in a way that was far beyond his authority and technical competence. Favoured by the interests of the Chief of Naval Headquarters, Admiral Paul Behncke, it led to uncontrolled scope for legal violations, criminal activity and high-handed action by individuals within the ministry. When his work was discovered in 1927, the scandal became known as the Lohmann Affair in Germany and led to the resignation of Reichswehr Minister Otto Gessler in January 1928 and director of naval command Admiral Hans Zenker. Lohmann himself was retired and his pension was cut, but he was never prosecuted, because to uncover the affair's true background would have been too great a risk. Completely impoverished, Lohmann died three years later of a heart attack. After he was relieved of duty, the clandestine rearmament programme was continued and expanded.
As a representative of the Sea Transport Department in the General Naval Office, Lohmann took part in the maritime armistice negotiations in 1919 in England. While there he worked with the Permanent Naval Allied Armistice Commission (PANAC) organisation to enable German shipping to commence overseas lines, which were critical to the recovery of the German economy. Lohmann secured over 1000 travel authorisations to enable German ships to pass through the blockade of Germany. He was still in England when the Kapp Putsch occurred on 13 March 1920, so his career was not compromised. When he returned, he was appointed commander (Chef der Seetransportabteilung der Reichsmarine) of the Naval Transport Division (BS) on 28 October 1920.
He was also on very good terms with Chief of Naval Headquarters, Admiral Paul Behncke and this further consolidated his position, receiving significant promotion of himself and the field of work. At the time, Behncke required an overview of the merchant marine as he believed it still had a role even under the Treaty of Versailles. Behncke subordinated Lohmann to the Ministry for Reconstruction on 21 December 1920 with a request that he attend all meetings where commercial shipping was discussed. In May 1921, Lohmann managed to secure some shipping that had been seized by the British and used for prisoner of war transports that were returned to their former owners, which raised his reputation amongst his colleagues considerably and set a precedent for future purchases. In October 1921, he visited Leningrad to reach an agreement for the release of German shipping that were still considered seaworthy with Leon Trotsky and foreign minister Georgy Chicherin. A further visit followed in May 1922, with a delegation to complete negotiations with the Russian Admiralty. While there, he met the German ambassador Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau and informed him that due to the influence of Hans von Seeckt, negotiations with Trotsky and all official bodies had turned sour. During his visits, he became acquainted with Else Ektimov, a Russian women of German descent and arranged for her to return to Germany.
The government under Reichskanzler Wilhelm Marx tried to limit the damage. The Wenkel articles were removed from publication under threat of prosecution for treason. However, by 10 August, it was clear that denial wouldn't work and the government decided to take a more measured approach, confirming only the essentials. The economic activities were portrayed as the work of a subordinate official that resulted in the financial mismanagement at the Phoebus company. What was then known as the Phoebus scandal become known as the Lohmann Affair.
On 13 August 1927, the government instructed President of the Court of Audit Friedrich Saemisch to investigate the incident in the hope of avoiding a government committee investigation. Lohmann believed he would be cleared of all blame as he considered it his job to exceed authority and to keep his actions secret from Naval Command to ensure the success of the rearmament programme. Saemisch found such an attitude was anathema to the strictures of Naval Command who wanted to dismiss him. However, Saemisch realised that such an action would have exposed the government to further scandal as there was many other aspects to Lohmanns work that were still unknown to the public. Instead, he recommended that Lohmann be quietly retired, on a reduced pension.
Saemisch submitted both a written report and oral summary to the government on 8 November 1927. Although Marx was facing significant pressure from the opposition parties to publish the report, he was hesitant to publish in case it led to further exposure, even though it was free of military secrets. On 28 January, Marx asked for the resignation of Reichswehr Minister Otto Gessler before a crucial parliamentary debate, ensuring the opposition parties had little ammunition to attack the government. Even so, on 1 March 1928, the budget committee demanded that it be published. Instead, Marx published a new report "Report on the nature, extent and implementation of the so-called Lohmann undertakings" on the 10 March 1928 that focused explicitly on the financial aspects of the Phoebus-Film AG company. Marx shared the original report with the heads of the opposition parties to stress the national security implications of keeping it secret. On 31 March 1928, the Marx government acting on Saemisch's recommendations, retired Lohmann, drastically reduced his pension and made him liable for the sum of 120,000RM for damages associated with Phoebus. His expected promotion to Vizeadmiral was also permanently deferred.
When he received the funds, Lohmann began to gradually develop a plan under the title "Principle of Reconstruction", to both finance and secure prohibited war materials, believing he could count on receiving further funding totaling 40-50million marks in the future. A 1926 ministry memorandum "Denkschrift über die Notwendigkeit der Beschaffung eines langfristigen Kredites zur Sicherstellung gewisser militärisch notwendiger Marinebelainge, denen aus verschiedenen Gründen beim Ordentlichen Marinehaushalt nicht Rechnung getragen Werden kann" (Memorandum on the necessity of obtaining a long-term loan to secure certain militarily necessary naval assets which, for various reasons, cannot be taken into account in the regular naval budget) illustrated Lohmanns financial concept.
To maintain the strictest secrecy in financing, when a particular project was started, only the defence minister and the finance minister were informed verbally of the details and nature of the loan. No audit was created. Then the department head would be informed and they would be responsible for signing the loan agreement and ensuring any legal details were correctly dealt with. Once the loan was secured, the repayment details were hidden in the naval budget, under a category of spend that couldn't easily be monitored or audited.
In October 1921, while Lohmann visited Leningrad to buy back seized German shipping, he used the visit with Leon Trotsky and foreign minister Georgy Chicherin to discuss cooperation on submarine development. In May 1922, Lohmann made a second visit to the Soviet Union with a group of business representatives aboard a steamer, but no agreement on cooperation could be reached. These discussions were primarily led by Yevgeny Berens and although no concrete agreement was reached, the Soviet Union agreed to buy German Accumulatoren-Fabrik AFA submarine batteries in July 1922. Lohmann blamed Head of the Army Command Hans von Seeckt for damaging the discussions, stating to the new Ambassador Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau in August that discussions has been proceeding well with Trotsky and Chicherin the year before, until von Seeckt intervened. On 29 December 1922, Lohmann forwarded a letter to von Brockdorff-Rantzau, to determine if a new meeting could be arranged to advance the discussions, but Brockdorff-Rantzau refused as he was only in the position a few weeks. In February 1923, Lohmann informed Brockdorff-Rantzau that several small Russian submarines that he saw in Saint Petersburg could be used as the basis for a repair contract in a joint operation. Lohmann wanted to send a naval architect to inspect the submarines and requested discuss the contract during a diplomatic visit to the country in 1923 as part of a delegation led by General Otto Hasse. However, Trotsky was ill and the discussions never took place. The submarine inspections did take place though and the architect identified a problem. What would happen if there was war during the contract period? In a letter from Brockdorff-Rantzau to Lohmann following the inspections, he stated that conditions weren't right for the contract to be agreed. He believed that strong military ties were necessary between Russia and Germany and these weren't in place. Lohmann decided to persevere and arranged for 6 million gold marks to finance the project but no further discussions took place during that period.
In 1924, Lohmann arranged a contract for the construction of several large freighters for the Soviet Union.
Meaningful conversations between the two countries didn't recommence until March 1926, when a diplomatic delegation led by Paul Behncke visited Moscow. This led to a Soviet Naval envoy visit to Germany, who agreed that negotiations could commence. This was followed by another delegation visit led by Rear Admiral Arno Spindler and Admiral in June 1926. Unlike the previous negotiations, an agreement was reached almost immediately with the Soviets requesting German technical and professional support in the construction of submarines. However, the relationship failed to develop and the agreement was broken, when the Reichmarine received a diplomatic communiqué in December 1926 stating that Soviet submarines couldn't be built to German designs due to a lack of funding.
The design office initially had difficulties attracting new orders and almost went bankrupt. The Reichsmarine specified exactly what type of submarines it would require in the future and had instructed the design office on what to build. The company signed contracts with Argentina, Italy, Estonia at below market price and Spain for six submarines. However, none of the designs led to firm orders. In spring 1925, the first construction order came from Turkey to build 2 500-ton submarines in the Fijenoord shipyard. Lohmann was kept informed of the negotiations for the contract by the IvS commercial director, Ulrich Blum and Otwi-Werke employee, "Gerber". To ensure the yards were competitive going forward, Lohmann provided 1,000,000RM as startup funding. Naval Command decided to build the submarines below cost as there was some doubt as to whether Turkey could pay the construction costs. When the contract was signed, 12 German engineers from the Kiel shipyard including Techel opened a design office in The Hague, to design the first u-boat.
In 1925, Lohmann worked with Reichsmarine officer to secure a submarine contract from the Soviet Union worth 30-50 million RM that had been held back for more than 2 years. At a meeting on 8 June 1925 between Moraht, the IvS and Turkish representatives secured the financing needed to build the Turkish submarines. These two contracts ensured the financial stability of IvS. When the funding announcement was made, representatives of the three German shipyards approached Naval Command with a request to leave the IvS consortium due to financial constraints in Germany, leaving Naval Command to assume the entire project risk. To manage the 28% of shares that Naval Command held in the IvS and all other submarine contracts, Lohmann created the holding company Mentor-Bilanz GmbH in 1925 that was managed by Robert Moraht. At the end of 1925, a submarine department was founded in Naval Command and ran by Admiral Arno Spindler to manage the company within the military.
By June 1927, Lohmann clearly understood that Naval Command had to develop a series of prototype submarines that could be tested and optimised during sea trials. The prototype would be then be sold and the money used to design and construct a new superior prototype. The first was a 755-ton submarine that began in the Cadiz shipyard in the beginning of February 1929. By 1930, the plan had faltered when Prime Minister of Spain Miguel Primo de Rivera died, resulting in the completed u-boat being sold to Turkey at a loss. Even after Lohmann left Naval Command in disgrace, the prototypes were still being designed and built. They led to a professionalisation of the submarine service, ultimately leading to a 900-ton IvS designed unit, that eventually became the Type IX submarine. When World War II began, Naval Command was amply prepared for submarine warfare due to this interwar work.
The company had some initial success with the Caspar C 24 that won the competition, although the company never became profitable even with the injection of new funding by Lohmann. The department that built the C24 was expanded and became a new standalone legal entity that was attached the ministry's naval aviation department, Gruppe BSx (Allgemeines Marineamt Seetransportabteiling) and funded by Lohmann. In 1925, Lohmann secured a 3.5million RM loan from Deutsche Bank, to build a seaplane manufacturing facility in Altenrhein, Switzerland, to develop the Dornier Do X, in a joint project between Dornier Flugzeugwerke and Luftschiffbau Zeppelin. Profits from the project were accrued by Lohmann. The Ministry of Economics (Reichswirtschaftsministerium), the Reich Ministry of Labour and the Reich Ministry of Transport were involved in establishing the project.
By 1927, Lohmann had invested 1.5million RM in Caspar-Werke, but the company was losing money. He decided to divest the shares and began negotiations with Hamburg America Line (Hapag) but was unable to secure a sale. The company continued operating after Lohmann left the ministry in 1927 as a test centre for seaplanes, aircraft catapults and naval radio equipment.While he was negotiating the sale, he worked on the development of catapult launchers on .
To build the other two larger tankers, an agreement was reached between Lohmann and the Bremen-based private bank , owned by , that was facilitated by the Bremen finance minister for a loan of 12million RM. Bremen-based AG Weser shipyard was to receive the contract to build them. As part of the agreement, it was decided the Navy was to construct a steamer at Norddeutscher Lloyd. To finalise the deal, the Bremen finance minister insisted that the loan agreement was approved by naval director Erich Raeder and Reich Finance Minister . At a meeting of 6 May 1926, Lohmann explained his plan of using a 12million loan to construct two large tankers. But Raeder and Peckert were looking for extra value from the contract and stipulated that two smaller tanker would be built alongside the one large tankers.
By buying two smaller tankers, instead of a third large tanker as already planned, Lohmann used the savings to create the Berlin Oil Transport Company that he owned outright, the Bremen Oil Transport Company that he also owned, as well as a freight forwarding company. In mid-1926, Lohmann had plans to create a vertically integrated oil company similar to BP but the idea was abandoned, due to the complexities of the plan and the huge amount of monies involved to finance it. Although at the same time he continued to invest in the oil transport companies.
The Barbara's first voyage to Italy and Spain were used by Lohmann to sell the idea of rotor cargo ships to various contacts and used a film created by Phoebus Film to promote them. His first port of call was to meet the Spanish king Alfonso XIII. Lohmann also met with Benito Mussolini in November 1926 to discuss an order for an 11000ton tanker that would use the rotor mechanism, but nothing came of the meeting.
This was followed by the payment of a stipend to the representatives of the Naval Transportation Division in Saint Petersburg and Leningrad to report on the movements of the Red Army and Soviet Navy. However, Lohmann was never satisfied with the quality of reports that the representatives were sending but would still make special requests, for example, in June 1924 he requested the composition of the Russian naval officer corps. After trying to financialise the naval transportation office in St Petersburg and failed, Lohmann attempted to establish a Russian company known as "Merotwal" (illegal under Russian law) that was to be used to pay agents of the naval representatives and at the same time, rent out a fleet of Reichsmarine cars that had been left in Saint Petersburg, before the war. In essence, it was an attempt to coordinate German-Soviet trade relations with a Lohmann associate "Lambert" in Berlin and at the same time earn more money. Lohmann attempted to keep the arrangement secret from both the Federal Foreign office and the German consulate in Saint Petersburg, but the venture failed when his associate was arrested in December 1923 for violating the foreign trade laws, in an operation not connected to Lohmann. Lohmann never returned to the venture after the winter break, due to unexpected resistance from within Naval Command, the low value of the intelligence he was receiving and other failures.
He also received intelligence reports from the German diplomat Heinrich Karl Fricke who served in the German consul in Cartagena, Spain. Fricke reported on the Spanish government, the Spanish Navy, the Admiralty as well as providing economic news regarding the speedboat market in Spain. Through Fricke, Lohmann was able to bribe Spanish officials to award a contract to Navis to salvage the Spanish battleship España that ran aground off Cape Tres Forcas on 26 August 1923.
By June 1924, Phoebus had issued shares to the value of 1.2million RM and received a loan of 870,000RM, organised by Lohmann. By the end of the year, Lohmann decided to increase his holdings in the film company to both attain greater control and provide the necessary capital to enable the company to build an in-house production facility. By March 1925, the company agreed to increase its issue to 1.8million shares, which lead Lohmann to invest a further 850,000RM. Lohmann's shares were managed by Lignose AG, the parent company of Phoebus with two accountants from the sea transport department overseeing them. In early-1926, the two accountants reported to Lohmann that Phoebus would need a minumum investment of 3,000,000 Reich Marks for the expansion. Lohmann approached the Minister of the Interior Erich Koch-Weser who Lohmann persuaded by stated that he hoped to use the film company "to influence the press and the public" and that "if everything is not to come irreversibly under American influence..". Koch-Weser approached Finance Minister Peter Reinhold who initially rejected the investment but eventually signed a counter guarantee from DekaBank to Phoebus in March 1926. Both Reinhold and Koch-Weser believed that Lignose would be liable if Phoebus went bankrupt although Lohmann didn't take the guarantee seriously believing the Reich would be liable. Of the 3 million extra funding, 578,000 RM immediately went on interest payments on the previous loans. Lohmann continued to provide loans to Phoebus. By February 1927, a further 3.5million Reichsmarks loan guarantee was provided by Disconto-Gesellschaft bank to Phoebus and a further 920,000 guarantee provided by Mendelssohn & Co bank in June 1927. Lohmann signed these two guarantees himself, as he was worried about repayments. Both Naval Command and the German government were never informed. He stated that "He believed that this had to be avoided at all costs because he feared that it could lead to the guarantee of March 26, 1926, covered by the signature of the ministers, becoming known". By the end of 1927, Lohmann expected a lucrative return on his investment which failed to materialise. He had only received 127,000RM on the share dividend.
When the Lohmann Affair was discovered, the company went bankrupt in the wake of the scandal. In 1928, the Munich-based Bavaria Film (Emelka) bought up the remaining assets of the company. The Reich received 4,000,000 RM from the sale.
In late 1926, the yard had received orders for two oil tankers and by that point Lohmann had decided to proceed with buying the whole yard. At the time, Schröder was conducting a merger of AG Weser and eight other shipyards, that resulted in the formation of Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau (Deschimag). On 10 December 1926, Lohmann approached Emil Georg von Stauss of Deutsche Bank for a loan of 15 million marks to support both yards with the expectation of new orders being received after the tankers were completed. The first new order received was the ocean liner SS Bremen. Later orders included tankers and fishing trawlers. However, when the Bremen was completed in July 1929, Deschimag and many other shipyards suffered an economic catastrophe due to a worldwide surplus of merchant shipping.
In a letter to Brockdorff-Rantzau sent on 22 February 1923, Lohmann described Sprenger as a very rich individual, who as owner of his own factories could make unilateral investment decisions without external input. At the time, Sprenger was planning to invest in Lohmann's Russian deal, which failed to materialise. On 8 March 1923, Lohmann requested that Sprenger open an account at the Mendelssohn & Co private bank to be used through the Otwi-Werke office in Berlin. Lohmann used the Otwi-Werke company office in Berlin as a contact point and in a number of financial business deals at the unobtrusive bank that weren't particularly legal. In late 1925, a dispute arose between , the director of Deschimag and Sprenger who was used to making his own decisions, that resulted in Lohmann's confidente in the company "Gerber" being fired. This caused difficulties for Lohmann and from that point forward he only dealt with Stapelfeldt in business related to the shipyards.
In 1926, Lohmann began to collaborate on projects with Echevarrieta. and established a joint holding company that would manage it. Through contacts with King Alfonso XIII and General Miguel Primo de Rivera, Echevarrieta had won a contract, arranged by Lohmann, to build a 750-ton submarine by German technicians in Cádiz, based on the PU-111 model of 1918, that would be designed by IvS for German Naval Command. Echevarrieta became bankrupt as his shipyard "Echevarrieta y Larrinaga Shipyard" was chronically underfunded and couldn't fulfill the contract, so Lohmann arranged to provide the full costs of the contract through Naval Command. The submarine with designation submarino E-1 was sold by Naval Command to Turkey to partially recoup costs, after Miguel Primo de Rivera fell from power in January 1930, along with his government.
The first project that Lohmann completed in 1925-1926 and supervised by Wilhelm Canaris, was the construction of a torpedo factory in Cadiz, in which German Naval Command Torpedo Research Institute played a major role in developing. The factory was able to develop two production ready torpedo models that were used in World War II. Lohmann wrote:
While German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann and Finance Minister Peter Reinhold were generally in favour of the collaboration, other members the German foreign office believed that Spains contracts with the English government made it unsuitable as a business partner. The reason for this was that the British Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering had extensive shipbuilding contracts in Spain that was in effect a monopoly. However, King Alfonso XIII expressed an interest in purchasing German naval armaments, for example fire-control systems, which swayed their decision to continue the collaboration. Lohmann planned to expand the torpedo factory to develop aircraft capable of dropping a torpedo as well as develop new speedboat models. Several speedboats were sent for testing at Echevarrieta's Cadiz shipyard. Even after Lohmann departed his position, Echevarrieta was willing to build 8 new speedboats to a new design produced by the Trayag successor company.
An oil transport company was also planned in detail with Echevarrieta. As part of the contract, the shipbuilder AG Wasser had to build two oil tankers, designed to be fast naval supply steamers. They were financed by the Spanish government for Spain who insisted they be built in Cadiz. In spring 1927, Canaris explored the idea of establishing a naval shipyyard in Cadiz to build the ships but the idea was abandoned. Canaris commented:
Lohmann arranged a 15million Reichsmarks loan from Deutsche Bank to fund the joint holding company and demanded that the arrangement remain strictly confidential "because certain military interests of a highly secretive nature are to be taken into account".
Lohmann and Canaris were involved in other business negotiations with Echevarrieta. In the summer 1927, Canaris provided a summary of communications for Naval Command involving Echevarrieta, where they discussed the film industry, naval mine production, and trawler design. They also discussed establishing a civilian airline with aircraft production by Lufthansa, Junkers to build the planes and Mercedes to build the engines. Echevarrieta established the Madrid-based airline, Iberia, Compañía Aérea de Transportes, that was incorporated on 28 June 1927 with a capital investment of 1.1 million Spanish peseta by Echevarrieta and Deutsche Luft Hansa holding 27% of the shares. The exploitation of the Spanish colony of Rio Muni was also discussed and Lohmann used his private capital in a contract.
In the summer of 1927, Lohmann received funding of 10,000RM for further patent evaluation that involved a fuel testing study, which exprimented with a secret fuel mixture suitable for burning in the mill. He received a further 200,000RM loan in the expectation that the device coud be marketed. In July 1928, Lohmann sought to market the mill in America, as he believed it would be attractive as a product that could be supported by the coal mining sector. In that way, he planned to use it to build a ship patents company with the "Huragan mill patent" as the first patent in the companies portfolio. It was to be designed as an offshoot of the maritime transport department who planned to patent their ship designs and licence those designs in America. However the device didn't work and the companies were forced into bankruptcy.
Although Ulrich Fritze was fine with the purchases, the April 1926 business deal that Lohmann arranged with Reichenbach and the German banking firm Schneidler for the purchase of an abattoir was described by Fritze as "grotesque". Lohmann paid 485,000 RM for the business while Reichenbach provided 15,000RM in equity. However, Reichenbach would have made a yearly return of 199,000 RM which Lohmann would only make a return on 131,000 RM. The business was facing losses and needed to expand to survive. In September 1926, Reichenbach suggested that formation of a company that could sell bacon to England. Lohmann seized on the idea as he hoped to both disrupt the lucrative Danish bacon business to England and at the same time build a fleet of refrigerated merchant ships that could be converted in the event of war into troop ships. Lohmann approached Admiral Zenker to discuss the idea who found it to be ill-conceived but Lohmann continued anyway. In February 1927, Lohmann formed a holding company, the Berliner Bacon Company with a total investment of 750,000RM by July 1927. Lohmann continued to invest in the company, but falling pork prices forced the company into bankruptcy, eventually costing the treasury 1.25million RM. In May 1927, Lohmann made a further investment on the advice of Reichenbach in a mine, totalling 340,000RM but the venture failed resulting in bankruptcy in the early 1930s.
1 | Parliamentary funding known as "Ruhrfunds" | 10,379,767.74 |
2 | Sale of prisoner of war transports | 924,798.52 |
3 | Sale of ships | 152,345.00 |
4 | Sale of equipment | 150,000 |
5 | Reichsmarine budget | 1,145,427.55 |
6 | Loans | 6,950,000.00 |
Total | 19,702,338.81 |
Navis | 844,000 |
Speedboat procurement | 600,000 |
Motor Yacht Club, Wannsee mortgage | 60,000 |
Luhr and Narval boats | 657,000 |
Trayag | 1,082,000 |
Caspar-Werke | 1,641,000 |
Travemünde site | 820,000 |
Hanseatic Yacht School | 1,040,000 |
High Seas Sports Association | 750,000 |
Tebeg | 50,000 |
Baltic Sailing Ship company | 54,000 |
House purchase in Lutzowüfer, Berlin | 588,000 |
Sirius fishing trawler shipping company | 1,325,000 |
Phoebus Film shares loan | 2,808,000 |
Bankverein, shares | 1,650,00 |
Bacon company | 1,235,000 |
Neustädter Slip shipyard and yacht school | 346,00 |
House purchase in Tiergarten | 1,895,000 |
Mine company | 340,000 |
Patent for coal dust driven grain mill | 621,000 |
Fuel prototype for mill | 10,000 |
Salvage Studies Society | 78,000 |
Interest charges | 1,500,000 |
Total | 19,949,00 |
Antiòquia Bank (Bremen) | 907,000 |
Clearing bank repayments | 1,330,000 |
Mortgage repayments | 1,750,000 |
Liabilities for Neustädter Slip | 415,000 |
Bank Association support monies | 176,000 |
Other settlement expenses | 144,000 |
Total | 4,722,000 |
Payments by Lohmann | 19,949,00 |
Payments of settlements to 15 March 1928 | 4,722,000 |
Sea trade obligations to 1931 | 3,000,000 |
4th supplementary budget, 1928 | 7,000,000 |
Total | 34,671,000 |
Phoebus Film | 7,420,000 |
Freighter constructions | 17,900,000 |
Norddeutscher Lloyd and Deschimag | 1,200,000 |
Caspar contract | 240,000 |
Total | 26,760,000 |
Passive | |
Obligations and expenditures | 34,671,000 |
Contingent liabilities | 500,000 |
Total | 35,171,000 |
Active | |
Realisation of shares and loan balances | 9,290,000 |
Burdens of Reichswehr | 25,871,000 |
Total | 35,161,000 |
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